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The Judicialization of Military Courts
By COLONEL JOHN JAY DOUGLASS*
PASSAGE of the Military Justice Act in 19681 was the latest in a
series of events that have combined to place qualified judges with full
judicial powers in military courts-martial. Beginning with the revi-
sion of the Articles of War in 1920, when law members were first placed
on the courts, 2 the position, prestige, and responsibilities of the judicial
members of the courts have gradually increased. Today the military
judge functions with powers strikingly similar to those of a federal dis-
trict judge.3
The 1968 legislation changed the title of the judicial member of
the court from "law officer" to "military judge,"4 but this embodied a
substantive change of considerable import rather than a mere redesigna-
tion. This author served as a law officer from 1955 to 1958; 12 years
later he returned to the bench as Area V Military Judge. The differ-
ences are striking. During this period, first administratively and later
by statute, the military judge became truly independent. By statute
and court decision he became the dominant figure in the courtroom,
rather than a mere arbiter of documents and evidence.
Superficially, the old position of law officer and the present posi-
tion of military judge seem quite similar. Like the law officer before
him, the military judge: (a) presides over general courts-martial, 5
* A.B., University of Nebraska, 1943; J.D., University of Michigan, 1952;
M.A., George Washington University, 1964; Commandant of the United States Army
Judge Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, 1970-.
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MrrAY JusTIcE arts. 1-140, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940
(Supp. V, 1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
2. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, art. 8, 41 Stat. 759, 788.
3. S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1968).
4. UCMJ art. 1(10), 10 U.S.C. § 801(10) (Supp. V, 1970).
5. A general court-martial is required to have a military judge. Id. art. 16(1),
10 U.S.C. § 816(1). Special courts-martial are not required to have a military judge.
Id. art. 16(2), 10 U.S.C. § 816(2). A special court-martial without a military judge,
however, may not adjudge a bad-conduct discharge, except in situations where physical
conditions or military requirements prevent his assignment. MANuAL FOR COuRTS-
MtrIAr., UNrrFD STATES % 15b (1969) [hereinafter cited as 1969 MANuALI. The
goal of the Army is to have "military judges presiding over all special courts-martial."
Hodson, Is There Justice in the Military, ARMY REsER E MAGAziNE, Nov.-Dec. 1969,
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(b) may not later act as staff judge advocate or legal officer to any re-
viewing authority upon the same case,6 (c) may not act as military
judge if he is an accuser or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as
investigating officer or counsel in the same case,7 (d) may neither con-
sult with the members of the court except in the presence of the accused,
trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor vote with the members of the
court,' (e) is immune from censure, reprimand, or admonishment by
any convening authority or commanding officer,9 (f) may be chal-
lenged for cause, 10 and (g) has the same duties to instruct the members
of the court."
These similarities between the military judge and the law officer,
however, should not obscure the significance of the additional respon-
sibilities imposed by the Military Justice Act of 1968. Additional re-
sponsibilities obviously raise new questions. What, for example, are
the duties of these new judges? And, how do the new statutory provi-
sions compare with actual practice as tempered both by practical nec-
essity and by the decisions of the military appellate courts?' 2
I. The Independent Judiciary
A major innovative consequence of the Military Justice Act of
1968 was the creation of an independent trial judiciary for the adminis-
tration of military justice. 3 In this respect, the act was essentially an
at 22. A summary court-martial need not have a military judge. UCMJ art. 16(3), 10
U.S.C. § 816(3) (Supp. V, 1970). The jurisdiction of the summary court-martial is
limited to adjudication of 1 month confinement, hard labor without confinement for
45 days, restriction for 2 months, or forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay. Id.
art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820. Trial before a summary court-martial is consensual on the
part of an accused, and if he objects, trial may be ordered by either special or general
court-martial, as may be appropriate. Id.
6. Id. art. 6(c), 10 U.S.C. § 806(c).
7. Id. art. 26(d), 10 U.S.C. § 826(d).
8. Id. art. 26(e), 10 U.S.C. § 826(e), amending 10 U.S.C. § 826(b) (1964).
9. UCMJ art. 37(a), 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (Supp. V, 1970). See discussion of
command influence in text accompanying notes 27-33 infra.
10. UCMJ art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. § 841(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
11. Id. art. 51(c), 10 U.S.C. § 851(c).
12. The two military appellate courts are the Court of Military Review, created
by the Military Justice Act of 1968, and the United States Court of Military Appeals.
UCMJ arts. 66-67, 10 U.S.C. §§ 866-67 (Supp. V, 1970). The Court of Military Re-
view is composed of attorneys, civilian or military, appointed by the Judge Advocate
General of the appropriate armed force. It may consider the entire record and decide
issues of fact. Id. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866. The United States Court of Military Ap-
peals is composed of three civilians appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, for a term of 15 years. It does not review questions of
fact. Id. art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867.
13. Ervin, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 MIL. L. REv. 77, 83, 88-91 (1969).
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outgrowth of a system administratively established in 1958 by the
United States Army, revised in 1962,14 and in that same year adopted
by the Navy.15 The Military Justice Act of 1968 adopted this sys-
tem almost in its entirety, thereby laying a statutory foundation for an
independent trial judiciary in all the services.
A. General Courts-Martial
The new law still vests the convening authority with responsibility
for detail of a military judge to the court-martial. 16 But this is a
pro forma responsibility, because the convening authority exercises no
discretion in choosing the judge. By contrast with past practice, no
military judges are now eligible for detail to general court-martial except
those certified as qualified by, designated by, assigned by, and directly
responsible to the Judge Advocate General of their respective services."7
In the Army, all military judges of general courts-martial and some mili-
tary judges of special courts-martial are assigned to the United States
Army Judiciary, an independent organization reporting directly to the
Judge Advocate General. 18
The judges are also assigned to particular "judicial areas" within
the judiciary, and to particular "judicial circuits" within the judicial
areas.19 The judicial areas and circuits are established and may be
dissolved by the Judge Advocate General.20 At present there are eight
judicial areas worldwide and thirty-two circuits. Each circuit includes
14. Army Reg. 22-8 (Oct. 14, 1964).
15. The Navy and Marine Corps had initiated a pilot program in 1960. SECNAV
Notice 5450d (Dec. 6, 1960). On July 9, 1962, the United States Navy-Marine Corps
Judiciary Activity came into being. SECNAVINST 5813.6 (May 9, 1962).
16. UCMJ art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (Supp. V, 1970). A court-martial is
created by a convening order issued by the convening authority. The order designates
the kind of court, the place and time it is to meet, the members of the court, and,
when appropriate, the members of the prosecution, defense and the military judge.
1969 MANUAL % 36b (1969).
17. UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c)(Supp. V, 1970). Article 26(c)
provides: "The military judge of a general court-martial shall be designated by the
Judge Advocate General . . . of the armed force of which the military judge is a
member for detail by the convening authority. . . . A commissioned officer who is
certified to be qualified for duty as a military judge of a general court-martial may
perform such duties only when he is assigned and directly responsible to the Judge
Advocate General, or his designee . . . and may perform duties of a judicial or non-
judicial nature other than those relating to his primary duty as a military judge of a
general court-martial when such duties are assigned to him by or with the approval of
that Judge Advocate General or his designee."
18. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 9-2(c)-(d) (change no. 3) (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
19. Id. para. 9-4.
20. Id.
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at least one-and usually more than one- "general court-martial juris-
diction."21
The senior judge in each area is responsible for the administration
of the military judge program within his jurisdiction.22 He determines
which general court-martial jurisdiction will come under the primary
responsibility of each military judge of general courts-martial within
his area.23 In order to "detail" a military judge to a general court-
martial, the convening authority does nothing more than contact the
military judge who has primary responsibility to preside over general
courts-martial in the particular jurisdiction. That military judge then
presides at the trial, if he is available. If he is not available, he selects a
substitute military judge who will be available to preside, and notifies
the convening authority of the substitute's identity.24 Thus when the
convening authority details a military judge to a general court-martial,
he has no opportunity to shop around for a judge whom he thinks may
be more complaisant than others. On the contrary, he may detail only
the one judge (or his chosen substitute) already designated by the Judge
Advocate General.
It is therefore apparent that the structure of the independent judi-
ciary, as established in all services by the 1968 act, completely frees
military judges of general courts-martial from control by the convening
authority, or by any other local commanding officer. The convening
authority may only detail the one judge (or his personally selected sub-
stitute) already designated for detail by the Judge Advocate General.
And what is even more important, the military judges are answerable
only to the United States Army Judiciary, and ultimately to the Judge
Advocate General.
B. Special Courts-Martial
The changes wrought by the 1968 legislation in the area of special
courts-martial were undoubtedly the most far-reaching. Particularly
noteworthy is the extension of the influence of lawyers to this court
level, where so many matters of military discipline are adjudged. In all
special court-martial proceedings, the accused is now entitled, as a mat-
ter of right, to legally qualified counsel. 5 Moreover, the law requires
21. Id.
22. Id. para. 9-6(1).
23. Id. para. 9-6(4).
24. Id. para. 9-8(a).
25. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. V, 1970). This is so "unless coun-
sel . . . cannot be obtained on account of physical conditions or military exigencies."
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that a military judge certified by the Judge Advocate General be de-
tailed to all special courts-martial where a bad-conduct discharge may
be adjudged.26
Within the Army, a number of special courts-martial military
judges are assigned to the United States Army Judiciary.27  The other
services have not assigned special court-martial military judges to their
independent judiciary organizations, but in all services the certified
general court-martial judges may sit in special courts-martial. 28  Due to
the great number of special courts-martial and the diversity of locations
at which special court-martial judges may be needed, many certified
special court-martial judges are not part of the United States Army Ju-
diciary. They are, instead, assigned to local staff judge advocate of-
fices and may be detailed by the convening authority to preside over
non-bad-conduct discharge special courts-martial-in addition to their
duties as judge advocates in the command. That portion of a "part
time" military judge's efficiency report which relates to his judicial
functions is prepared by the general court-martial judge in whose ju-
dicial circuit he acts.30
1. "Bad-Conduct Discharge" Cases
Prior to each trial by special court-martial to which it is desired
to detail a military judge,31 the special court-martial convening authority
26. 1969 MANUAL 15(b). This is so "except in any case in which a military
judge could not be detailed because of physical conditions or military exigencies."
Senator Ervin, a principal architect of the 1968 Act and the prime mover in secur-
ing its passage, has stressed the Congressional intent that this exception should seldom
be invoked. 'The Senate Report emphasizes that military judges must be assigned to all
[bad-conduct discharge special courts-martial], if at all possible, because of the serious-
ness of a punitive discharge, and particularly since, under other provisions of the Act,
both the government and the defense will now be represented by lawyers in such trials.
[Citing S. Rep. No. 1601, 90 Cong. 2d Sess. S-6 (1968)]. It is contemplated that
... the unavailability exception will be reserved for cases of legitimate impossibility
and that the appellate decisions on this provisions [sic] will so insure." Ervin, supra
note 13, at 90.
27. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 9-2(d) (1) (change no. 3) (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
28. See UCMJ art. 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
29. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 9-2(d) (2) (change no. 3) (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
30. Id. para. 9-6(7). The UCMJ provides that "unless the court-martial was
convened by the President or the Secretary concerned, neither the convening authority
nor any member of his staff shall prepare or review any report concerning the effective-
ness, fitness, or efficiency of the military judge so detailed, which relates to his per-
formance of duty as a military judge." UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c)
(Supp. V, 1970).
31. In all special courts-martial cases where a bad-conduct discharge can be ad-
judged, a military judge must be detailed, except in extraordinary situations. See
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submits a request for a military judge to the staff judge advocate of the
general court-martial convening authority.3 2  This request informs the
staff judge advocate of the nature of the charge, the estimated duration
of the trial, the proposed date, the place of the trial, and the special
factors, if any, bearing on the request.8 3 The staff judge advocate then
notifies the general court-martial military judge of the jurisdiction in all
cases that could result in a bad-conduct discharge. 34  In such cases, the
request is acted upon as though it were a request for a military judge
of a general court-martial, except that a special court-martial military
judge assigned to the United States Army Judiciary may be detailed. 35
The procedure for detailing a military judge to a bad-conduct-discharge
special court-martial is exactly the same as the detailing procedure for a
general court-martial. In each instance, the convening authority has no
voice in the matter of choosing the judge.
2. "'Non-Bad-Conduct Discharge" Cases
In cases to be referred to a non-bad-conduct discharge special
court-martial, the military judge of the general court-martial arranges
the availability of one of the military judges over whom he exercises ad-
ministrative responsibility.36 If none is available, the assistance of the
area military judge is sought.37 If at this point no military judge as-
signed to the United States Army Judiciary is available, a military judge
from the office of the staff judge advocate may be detailed to sit.3"
This procedure insures that even in cases not involving a bad con-
duct discharge, "part-time" judges are used only when "full-time"
judges are unavailable. As a practical matter, the resident general
court-martial military judge establishes a docket system under which the
"part-time" special court-martial military judges are made available for
assignment to cases without reference back to the staff judge advocate
in each case. The expressed view of the Secretary of the Army that a
text accompanying note 30 supra. In cases where a bad-conduct discharge cannot be
adjudged, the decision whether or not to detail a military judge is left to what an au-
thoritative commentator terms the "unfettered discretion" of the convening authority.
Ervin, supra note 13, at 90. This same commentator predicts, however, that use of
military judges in non-bad-conduct discharge special courts-martial will steadily increase.
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military judge is to be used whenever practicable39 has led convening
authorities automatically to request military judges in those locations
where sufficient judicial personnel are available. In such cases, the
cumbersome procedure described above becomes unnecessary.
C. Additional Safeguards Against Command Influence
In addition to the immunity afforded the military judge by the very
structure of the judiciary and its administration, the 1968 act sets up
various specific statutory safeguards against command influence. The
first of these has been adverted to already: Military judges, not being
in the chain of command of local commanders, are not rated by them,
but rather by their superiors within the United States Army Judiciary.40
Consequently, the commander cannot adversely affect a full-time mili-
tary judge's efficiency report and thereby jeopardize his career. More-
over, article 37 of the Uniform Code41 prohibits a convening authority
from unlawfully influencing the action of the court. The prohibited
action includes the censure, reprimand, or admonishment of a military
judge.42
Historically, the military courts have continually proclaimed the
independence of the military judge or law officer. In United States v.
Berry,43 the court stated that:
The complete independence of the law member and his unshackled
freedom from direction of any sort or nature are, we entertain no
doubt, vital, integral, even crucial, elements of the legislative ef-
fort to minimize opportunity for the exercise of control over the
court-martial process by any agency of command. 44
Recently, in United States v. Priest,45 the law officer had a pre-
trial conference with the staff judge advocate concerning one of the
charges and specifications, and sought the government's reaction to his
contemplated ruling that although the specification did not state the
offense charged, it would state a lesser included offense. The court de-
clared that by taking part in such a conference, the law office "departed
from the impartial and independent role assigned to him by the Con-
gress and affirmed by the decisions of this Court. 46 Such a procedure
was held prejudicially erroneous.
39. 69-25 JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERV. 13 (DA Pam 27-69-25).
40. See note 24 supra.
41. 10 U.S.C. § 837 (Supp. V, 1970).
42. Id.
43. 1 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 2 C.M.R. 141 (1952).
44. Id. at 240, 2 C.M.R. at 146.
45. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 446, 42 C.M.R. 48 (1970).
46. Id. at 448, 42 C.M.R. at 50.
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In actual practice, military judges consider themselves totally inde-
pendent of local convening authorities. As a result, the problem of
command influence on the military judge rarely arises. Commanders
and staff judge advocates are so apprehensive of prejudicing a case by
even the appearance of contact with the military judge that the military
judge has come to be isolated within the military community. He is
not consulted on any legal problems, except those involving court ad-
ministration. In general, every effort is made to prevent the slightest
appearance of command influence. This concern can of course make
the military judge's life a lonely one. But as the independent judiciary
matures, military judges may become less isolated, and their advice may
be sought more often on major legal problems.
II. Trial by Military Judge Alone
The one feature of the Military Justice Act of 1968 which pro-
duced the greatest change in the courts-martial system was the provi-
sion permitting defendants to opt for a trial by military judge alone.47
Neither the authors of this provision nor the administrators of military
justice in the services anticipated that the overwhelming majority of
defendants before courts-martial would take this option. The statute
permits an accused to elect trial by military judge alone in all general
courts-martial, and in any special courts-martial to which a military
judge has been detailed.4" This election of trial by military judge alone
may be made by the accused only after he knows the identity of the
military judge,4 9 and it must be in writing." °
This provision was modeled after rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure."' But the Military Justice Act, unlike the Fed-
eral Rules, does not condition the accused's right to waive a jury trial
on the consent of the Government (i.e., the convening authority). 52
By excluding the convening authority from the proceedings, the act
47. See Ervin, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 45 MIL. L. REv. 77, 92 (1969).
48. UCMJ art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V, 1970). See text accompanying
notes 21-26 supra for a discussion of the detailing of military judges to special courts-
martial. It is the policy of the Army to attempt to have military judges for all spe-
cial courts-martial. See notes 4, 26 supra. At Fort Knox, Kentucky, since August 1,
1969, all special courts-martial have had military judges. Cutler, A Year-End Survey
of the New Military Justice Act at Fort Knox (unpublished).
49. UCMJ art. 16(1)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 816(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1970).
50. Id. The right to elect trial by military judge exists until the court is assem-
bled. 1969 MANUAL 53(d)(2). Failure to make the election in writing has been
held to be error, although not always prejudicial. Harris, CM 421781 (Feb. 16, 1970);
Perry, SPCM 5672 (May 5, 1970).
51. S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
52. Military Judge Memo. No. 47, 69-21 JUDGE ADVOcATE LEGAL SERV. 18 (DA
Pam 27-69-21). The reason for not permitting the convening authority to consent to
[Vol. 22
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sets up another effective barrier to any improper command influence.
Most military judges, acting out of an abundance of caution, will ask
the trial counsel if he knows of any reason why approval of the accused's
request for trial by a military judge should not be granted; but usually
the only purpose of this inquiry is to put the Government's views on the
record. The military judge alone approves the request for such a trial,
and he may refuse the request only when it appears that the accused
did not intelligently waive his right to trial by court members.
5 3
This rather substantial limitation on the military judge's discretion
to deny requests for trial by judge alone does not lessen his responsi-
bility to establish on the record that the accused knows of his right to
request trial by judge alone, and (in the event the accused has sub-
mitted such a request) to satisfy himself as to the accused's knowledge
and understanding of this request.54 An inquiry in this regard must
be made before the court is assembled,55 and the military judge must
insure that the accused's election stems from "a conscious realization
by the accused that he has waived trial by court members." 55 The mili-
tary judge should not rely on a simple statement by defense counsel and
accused to the effect that accused has indeed discussed the problem
with defense counsel and has made his election with knowledge of the
consequences. Rather, the military judge should make an inquiry fol-
lowing a prescribed form. Failure to do so, or the omission of a part of
the form of inquiry, may constitute reversible error. 7
trial by military judge alone stems from "[t]he command structure in the military
[which] presents a possibility of undue prejudicial command influence that is not
present in civilian life. In any case the military judge, after having heard arguments
from the trial counsel and defense counsel concerning the appropriateness of trial by
the military judge alone, will be in the best position to protect the interests of both
the Government and the accused." S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968).
53. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 9-5(c) (change no. 3) (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
The military judge may not refuse a request for trial by him alone to save embarrass-
ment or harassment. This strict rule is appropriate because refusal results in trial by
court members, not by jury. Military Judge Memo. No. 47, 69-21 JUDGE ADVOCATE
LE.A. SERV. 18 (DA Pam 27-69-21).
54. Military Judge Memo. No. 47, 69-21 JUDGE ADVOCATE Lunwa. SERV. 18, 19
(DA Pam 27-69-21).
55. UCMJ art. 16(l)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 816(l)(B) (Supp. V, 1970); 1969 M uOAL
53 (b) (2).
56. Harris, CM 421781 (Feb. 16, 1970).
57. See, e.g., Harris, CM 421781 (Feb. 16, 1970); Caraveo, CM 422669 (May 5,
1970); Perry, SPCM 5672 (May 5, 1970).
In United States v. Turner, Civil No. 22,948 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 27, 1970) and
United States v. Jenkins, Civil No. 23,015 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 6, 1970), the court
held that a lack of inquiry was waived by the accused's failure to object, and indicated
that the failure of the military judge to comply with Paragraph 53(d) (2) of the 1969
Manual would be tested under the harmless error doctrine.
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This whole inquiry procedure seems to reflect an excessive pre-
occupation, so often manifest in new areas of the law, with form as
compared to substance. Although the law specifically requires the
accused's election to be made in writing, failure to comply with this
requirement would scarcely appear prejudicial after the judge has made
so extensive an inquiry. On the other hand, after introduction into evi-
dence of a written request which sets forth the facts on which inquiry
is required, the oral inquiry is at best redundant. At worst, it seems
to reflect unfavorably on the ability and integrity of the defense coun-
sel who prepared the document.
Despite these minor procedural annoyances, however, trial by
military judge alone has taken place in the overwhelming majority of
cases." The result has been an increase in both the speed of trials and
the number of trials that can be handled by each court-martial juris-
ction.'9 It should be noted that giving the accused a statutory elec-
tion allows him to "forum shop" between a judge and court members.
The accused never has an opportunity to "shop" among judges, since he
is required to know the name of the detailed judge before he makes his
election." Once detailed to a case, a military judge is not normally re-
moved, 6' and changes of venue are rare.62 The military judge who
acquires a reputation for harsh sentences may find himself trying more
and more of his cases with members. Conversely, military judges
58. 3rd Quarter of 1969 [Oct. 31-Dec. 31]
Total General Courts-Martial 635
Military Judge alone 556
Total Special Courts-Martial 10,603
Military Judge detailed 8,926
Military Judge alone 8,508*
1st Quarter of 1970 [Dec. 31-Mar. 311
Total General Courts-Martial 613
Military Judge alone 522
Total Special Courts-Martial 9,247
Military Judge detailed 8,314
Military Judge alone 8,032*
* Figures based on field reports, compiled by the U.S. Army Judiciary.
At Fort Knox, in 112 special courts-martial only 11 were before a court; of 70
general courts-martial only 4 were before a court. Cutler, A Year-End Survey of the
New Military Justice Act at Fort Knox (unpublished). The Navy has had 118 out of
196 general courts-martial before a military judge alone, and the Air Force has had 33
percent of its general courts-martial before a military judge alone. Newark News,
Sept. 28, 1969, at 26, col. 2.
59. Cutler, supra note 58. One general court-martial judge and two special
court-martial judges handle all cases at Ft. Knox.
60. UCMJ art. 16(1)(B), 10 U.S.C. § 816(1)(B) (Supp. V, 1970).
61. See 1969 MANUAL 39(e).
62. See id. 69(e).
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known to be lenient are likely to have few trials with court members."3
Counsels' initial reaction to the newly-conferred right of election was to
seek military judges for trial almost automatically without making any
attempt to discriminate on the basis of the facts of any particular case.
As counsel become better acquainted with the system and with the
individual temperaments of different military judges, it seems probable
that the election will be less automatic and that trials before a military
judge alone will then level off at a lower percentage.
mn. The Article 39a Session
Another long-sought and highly significant improvement in mili-
tary court procedure authorized by the Military Justice Act of 1968 was
the pretrial session, commonly referred to as the "39a session.""4 Dur-
ing the period from 1951 to 1969, the United States Court of Military
Appeals came to place greater and greater responsibility for conduct
of the trial on the law officer. Proper discharge of this responsibility
required the law officer to hold lengthy sessions with accused and coun-
sel for both sides, out of the hearing of the court members. Transcripts
of these "out-of-court" hearings were appended as appellate exhibits to
the records and were often as voluminous as the trial record itself.
Under the law as it existed prior to 1 August 1969, however, no
sessions of the court could be held until the court was convened, and
no specific authority was provided for pretrial sessions. As a result, the
following cumbersome procedure came into use. First the court mem-
bers (or jury) would be called, and the court would be convened. Im-
mediately thereafter, an out-of-court session would be held; the court
members had to wait long periods of time for the conclusion of hearings
63. At Ft. Knox, the universal acceptance of the military judge alone reflected a
feeling on the part of accused persons and their counsel that they would get a better
break from a military judge alone. This feeling is true in the more serious military
offenses, such as long AWOL's. In the minor cases, however, the sentences of judges
are very similar to those of full courts. Cutler, supra note 58.
64. UCMY art. 39(a), 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)(Supp. V, 1970). The adoption of
this procedure was urged by the United States Court of Military Appeals for several
years. E.g., United States v. Kendall, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 561, 38 C.M.R. 359 (1968);
United States v. Robinson, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 674, 33 C.M.R. 106 (1963) A 39a session
is a part of the trial and must be conducted in the presence of the accused, defense
counsel and trial counsel. While it may be used as a "pretrial session," the 39(a)
session may also be used at any time during or after the trial to dispose of matters out
of hearing of the court, before the judge alone. 1969 MANUAL 53(d)(1). An
election for trial by military judge alone obviates the necessity for a 39(a) session.
Goldschlager, The Military Judge, A New Judicial Capacity, 11 JAG L. REv. (Air
Force) 175, 179 (1969). The purpose of the adoption of the 39(a) session was to con-
form the military to practice in the United States district courts. S. REP. No. 1601,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1968).
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on matters solely for determination by the law officer. From time to time
venturesome law officers attempted to hold pretrial sessions on their
own before the court had been convened, but in every case this proce-
dure was held erroneous by the appellate courts.6 5
The proper use of the 39a session greatly reduces the time re-
quired for the actual trial. In fact in many instances, it will actually en-
able the judge to dispose of the case before the court members are as-
sembled. At this session the military judge disposes of interlocutory mo-
tions raising defenses and objections,66 and decides such other matters
as he may legally rule upon alone. He also holds the arraignment, re-
ceives the pleas of accused, disposes of other matters which do not re-
quire the presence of court members, and may enter a finding of
guilty. 67
A typical issue decided in a 39a session is the admissibility of a
confession.68 Since this question may now be decided before the court
assembles, the members are no longer required to waste considerable
time awaiting the decision of the judge. If the judge decides to admit
the statement, the issue of its voluntariness may nevertheless be reliti-
gated before the full court. 9
During a 39a session, the military judge will also examine the
convening order, insure that the reporter and counsel have been sworn,
take the oath of those not previously sworn, and permit the accused to
challenge him for cause.7 ° He will also make certain that the accused
is fully cognizant of his right to counsel under article 38(b) of the
code. 71  Finally, if the accused has requested trial by military judge
alone, the judge will consider the request at this time.72
65. E.g., United States v. Kendall, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 561, 38 C.M.R. 359, United
States v. Robinson, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 674, 33 C.M.R. 206 (1963).
66. 1969 MANUAL t 66(b).




70. 1969 MANUAL 61(i), 62 & app. 8.
71. The explanation of the right to counsel has been formalized in MILrrARY
JUDGES GUIDE (DA Pam 27-15). The military judge must not only inquire as to
whether the accused understands this right, but must explain the right again. The re-
quirement is that every record of trial must reflect that the accused personally re-
sponded to direct questions from the military judge relating to each of the elements of
article 38(b) of the Uniform Code as well as his understanding of his entitlements
thereunder. United States v. Donohew, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 149, 39 C.M.R. 149 (1969).
This requirement is a frequent source of error and amounts to an elevation of form
over substance. Certainly, an accused should be aware of his rights, but the procedure
for determining his awareness should be left to the military judge to tailor the inquiry
to the individual defendant, with reversal only for abuse of discretion.
72. 1969 MANUAL 53(d)(2)(b).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
January 1971J MILITARY COURTS
One of the questions not answered by either the Uniform Code
or the Manual for Courts-Martial is whether a 39a session is required
in a trial by military judge alone. Strictly speaking, the 39a session is
a part of the trial conducted out of the presence of the court members.
Thus in trials by military judge alone, where no court members are
present, there is no necessity for a 39a session; the military judge may
proceed with the trial himself and handle all of the motions as he
wishes. Different military judges have handled this situation in dif-
ferent ways, but whatever tack is taken, the question is more a matter
of semantics than of substance.
It is contemplated that at the article 39(a) session, counsel will
raise all matters capable of final disposition by the military judge alone.
Further, certain objections are deemed waived if not raised at the 39a
session.73
Finally, the 39a session may be held at any time during trial in
order to dispose of matters outside the hearing of the court members.
For example, the 39a session may be held after the announcement of
the sentence in order to dispose of matters raised by appellate authori-
ties, such as questions of jurisdiction or speedy trial.74
IV. The Guilty Plea
Another problem for the military judge-sitting with or without
court members-concerns the guilty plea. The military judge like the
federal district judge,71 is required to make a detailed inquiry into the
providency of a guilty plea.78 Paragraph 70(b) of the Manual for
Courts-Martial provides that if, after pleading guilty, an accused makes
any subsequent statement that raises doubts about the providency of the
plea, the judge must renew his inqiury, and may be required to enter a
plea of not guilty.77
In United States v. Care,78 the law officer simply inquired whether
the accused knew the elements of the offense, without troubling to delin-
73. Id. I 67(b), 69(a).
74. Id. 1 53(d)(1).
75. FED. R. CiuM. P. 11.
76. UCMI art. 45, 10 U.S.C. § 845 (Supp. V, 1970). With respect to any
charge, except one involving the death penalty, a plea of guilty may, if permitted by
regulations of the Secretary concerned, be entered. 1969 MANuAx 70(a), 70(b) (5).
77. 1969 MANuAL 70(b). Nonobservance of paragraph 70(b) will result in
reversible error. E.g., United States v. Williams, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 334, 41 C.M.R. 334
(1970); Gonzalez-Otero, CM 422670 (April 15, 1970); Alward, CM 421416 (Dec. 4,
1969).
78. 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).
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eate the elements of the offense for the accused. The court held that:
[A] plea of guilty may meet the required standards if on the basis
of the whole record the showing is clear that the plea was truly
voluntary, even if the trial judge has not personally addressed the
accused and determined that the defendant possesses an under-
standing of the law in relation to the facts.79
Further, the court noted that the accused in Care knew the "acts and
intent necessary in the case and consequently his plea was voluntary.)8 0
The court pointed out, however, that in future cases the record
must reflect not only that the elements of each offense charged have
been explained to the accused but also that the military trial judge or
the president has questioned the accused about what he did or did not
do, and what he intended (where this is pertinent), to make clear the
basis for a determination by the military trial judge or president whether
the acts or the omissions of the accused constituted the offense or of-
fenses to which he is pleading guilty.81 But this requirement is not
satisfied by generalized questions such as whether the accused realizes
that a guilty plea admits "every element charged and every act or
omission alleged and authorizes conviction of the offense without fur-
ther proof. '82
Moreover, in the Care case it was held that the military judge
must personally address the accused, and must advise him that his plea
entails a waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to a
trial of the facts by a court-martial, and his right to be confronted by
the witnesses against him. This explanation of the consequences of the
guilty plea-taken from Boykin v. Alabama- 8  is rather difficult for
an accused to understand. Although the accused will generally state
unequivocally that he understands it, a conscientious military judge can-
not fail to question in his own mind whether all the consequences are in
fact clear to the defendant. This is especially true in cases where the
accused pleads guilty to one or more charge and not guilty to others.
Based upon the foregoing inquiries and such additional interrogation as
the military judge deems necessary, he must, before accepting the plea,
make a finding that there is a knowing, intelligent, and conscious
waiver.8 4
79. Id. at 539, 40 C.M.R. at 251.
80. Id. at 541, 40 C.M.R. at 253.
81. Id. 40 C.M.R. at 253.
82. United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 541, 40 C.M.R. 247, 257.
83. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
84. United States v. Care, 18 U.S.C.M.A. 535, 541, 40 C.M.R. 247, 253 (1969).
United States v. Palos, Civil No. 22,991 (U.S.C.M.A., Nov. 6, 1970) held that a failure
to make and note the finding for the record was not error. Rather the court inferred
the necessary determination from the military judge's interrogation of the accused.
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Finally, the military judge, like a federal district judge, must make
a finding that there is a factual basis for the plea. 5  This may well come
from direct questioning of the accused as to those facts surrounding the
incident that originally led to the charges. In a trial before a judge alone
where the facts come from oral inquiry of the accused and where the
plea is later determined not to be provident, a problem is presented:
The statements made by the accused during the oral inquiry cannot be
erased completely from the judge's mind in the event that the accused
does not wish to make any statement on the merits in the later trial of
the case.
V. Sentencing
When the act of 1968 authorized the military judge to try cases
alone, it gave him the concomitant responsibility of determining the
sentence. This was perhaps the most awesome change of all from the
viewpoint of the officer who came to the bench. For the first time, the
military judge has to determine appropriate sentences and guard against
disparity between sentences adjudged in similar cases. 86 The Manual
for Courts-Martial contains a Table of Maximum Punishments8 7 pre-
scribed by Presidential Executive Order."" This table, however, is
merely what its title implies: an upper limit on punishment. The
Manual expressly provides that the table "should not be interpreted as
indicating what is an appropriate sentence." '89 Rather the sentence
"should be determined after a consideration of all the facts and circum-
stances involved in the case, regardless of the state of the trial in which
they were established."9 0
Although the act of 1968 did not so require, this section of the
Manual has been modified by a provision enabling the military judge
to furnish the court members with supplementary information from the
85. 1969 MANUAL 70(a).
86. Military Judge Memo. No. 51, 69-27 JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERV. 18
(DA Pam 27-69-27).
87. 1969 MANUAL 1127(c).
88. Exec. Order No. 11,476, 3 C.F.R. 132 (Supp. 1970). The power to deter-
mine punishment is specifically reserved for the President. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C.
§ 856 (1964).
89. 1969 MANUAL 176(a) (2).
90. Id. It should be noted at this point that the military, in the presentencing
stage of trial, permits the defense to introduce matters in extenuation and mitigation.
Rules of evidence are relaxed, and the accused may make an unsworn statement which
may be impeached but not cross-examined. Id. I 75(c). The Government may
prevent certain matters, including data as to service and evidence of previous convic-
tions. Id. 75(b)(2). In a guilty plea case, matters in aggravation may be pre-
sented by the Government. These matters are evidence available and admissible but
not introduced before findings. Id.
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accused's personnel record for consideration prior to sentencing.9 This
Manual provision was implemented in Army Regulation No. 27-10
(Change No. 3, 27 May 1969); it states that records of article 15 pun-
ishment and the Form 20 (Qualification Record) of the accused may
be available to the military judge.12 If the case is heard before court
members, the military judge furnishes the court with any information
pertaining to past conduct and performance of the accused. Other mat-
ters available to the military judge are: (a) evidence of other offenses
or acts of misconduct which were properly introduced in the case, even
for a limited purpose before findings; (b) the character of the accused
as evidenced in former discharges; (c) the number and character of
previous convictions; (d) the fact that a guilty plea is a mitigating fac-
tor; (e) the nature and duration of any pretrial restraint; (f) evidence
of mental impairment or deficiency; and (g) evidence of any extenuat-
ing, mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 93
In addition to familiarizing themselves with the foregoing eviden-
tiary materials, it has been suggested9" that judges should visit confine-
ment facilities, and should become familiar with clemency, parole and
abatement policies, opportunities for correctional training, and the sta-
tistics concerning prevalence of offenses within the judge's jurisdiction.
The judge is warned that the latter information should be obtained from
a public source, and in a manner consistent with the rights of the ac-
cused. Under no circumstances should information be obtained from
an ex parte meeting between the military judge and an agent of the
Government.95 It might be argued, of course, that a guided tour
through a stockade or a perusal of crime statistics is ex parte informa-
tion and therefore suspect. Further, military judges may make spe-
cific findings and recommendations; e.g., for clemency or for an ad-
ministrative discharge.96
One issue that arises in connection with sentencing is whether the
military judge may properly obtain knowledge of a pretrial agreement
provision by which the convening authority has promised that the ac-
cused will not receive a sentence in excess of a certain maximum. 97
91. Id. 75(d).
92. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 2-20 (b) (change no. 3 (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
93. 1969 MANUAL 76(a)(2).
94. Military Judge Memo. No. 51, 69-27 JUDGE ADVOCATE LEGAL SERV. 18 (DA
Pam 27-69-27).
95. Id.
96. See 1969 MANUAL 74(i), 77(a). Military judges do not have power to
suspend sentences. See id. 97(a).
97. Another unique feature of the military justice system is the practice of plea
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The most recent judicial pronouncement on this issue is United States
v. Villa.9 There the military judge, during his inquiry as to the
providence of the accused's guilty plea, acquired information indicat-
ing that there had been a pretrial agreement in which the accused prom-
ised to plead guilty in exchange for the convening authority's promise
to reduce the charges and limit the maximum sentence. After request-
ing confirmation of this, the judge was told that such an agreement had
indeed been made. He thereupon requested and was given a copy of
the agreement.
On appeal, Villa contended that when the Government apprised
the judge of the sentence provision in the pretrial agreement, it thereby
exerted a "form of command influence" which destroyed the judge's
"objectivity." The court interpreted this contention as also challenging
the propriety of the judge's knowledge that the charge had been re-
duced. The essence of Villa's two-pronged contention seems to have
been: (1) that the judge would regard the agreed-upon maximum sen-
tence as the sentence desired by the convening authority, and would
therefore be strongly inclined to impose the maximum sentence; and
(2) that the judge would regard a reduced charge as an indication
that the accused, who is quite possibly guilty of more than he was
charged with, should receive the severest possible sentence. The court
rejected each aspect of this contention.
Showing the judge a pretrial agreement that reduces the charges,
the court reasoned, is somewhat akin to a Government motion to dis-
miss one or more of several counts-in each instance, the judge is made
aware that the charges have been reduced; yet the latter procedure has
never been thought objectionable on that account. The court further
observed that in federal courts, knowledge of the elimination of charges
is not deemed to prejudice the judge.
Turning to the propriety of a procedure whereby the judge sees the
sentence provision of a pretrial agreement, the court concluded that the
judge, in order to fulfill his duties, must review such a provision where
one exists. The military judge is required to satisfy himself that the
bargaining. An accused may make an agreement with the convening authority to plead
guilty in exchange for a promise not to impose a sentence over a specified amount.
This agreement is enforceable, and if the court imposes a harsher sentence than pro-
vided for in the agreement, the convening authority must reduce the sentence to the
agreed limit. United States v. Brice, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 336, 38 C.M.R. 134 (1967). If
the accused receives a lighter sentence, however, the convening authority cannot in-
crease the sentence to the agreed sentence. Thus, the accused can be assured of a
certain sentence, with the chance of getting a better break from the court.
98. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 42 C.M.R. 116 (1970).
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accused understands the meaning and effect of his guilty plea. By nec-
essary implication, therefore, the judge must also satisfy himself that
the accused understands what maximum sentence he may receive as a
result of pleading guilty. Whenever a pretrial agreement changes the
maximum sentence, it also changes the accused's understanding of the
sentence. Thus the court in Villa found a good reason for the militaryjudge to see the sentence portion of a pretrial agreement: he would
otherwise be unable to determine whether or not the accused under-
stands it.
As to the more general question whether knowledge of an agreed
maximum sentence would prejudice the judge, the Villa court decided
that it would not. Such knowledge could not induce the judge to im-
pose a sentence greater than the agreed maximum, the court noted,
since the greater sentence could have no legal effect. Thus there could
be no prejudice to the accused even if the judge considered the agreed
maximum sentence too lenient.
But a point of more serious concern was whether knowledge of
the agreed maximum sentence would induce the judge to impose that
very sentence, instead of some lesser sentence which he might have im-
posed had he not known of the agreement. Noting that in some cases,
changes in conditions occurring between the agreement and the trial
(e.g., the accused might "serve part of his sentence" in the form of
pretrial confinement) would virtually compel imposition of some lesser
sentence, the court concluded:
Neither the convening authority nor the military judge would re-
gard the agreement as prescribing a sentence which the militaryjudge could not change without derogating the power and the posi-
tion of the convening authority.
The court thought, moreover, that both the convening authority and
the judge would "treat the sentence provision of an agreement as impor-
tant only to the effectuation of the agreement, and not as an order or wish
on the part of the convening authority to influence the judge.
Hence the court could perceive no appreciable risk of prejudice in this
regard.
By laying down the rule that the judge always may-and perhaps
always should-see the sentence portion of a pretrial agreement, United
States v. Villa seems to alter previous policy on pretrial agreements.
Previous policy dictated that until the sentence had been announced,
the military judge should not normally see any part of a pretrial agree-
ment relative to maximum sentence.9 9 Prior to Villa, military judges
99. MILITARY JUDGES GUIDE, ch. 3 (DA Pam 27-9).
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did not, as a general rule, review the sentence portion of a pretrial
agreement. On the contrary, they customarily directed that this por-
tion be included in an annex to the record that was not available to the
judge.
One very recent case indicates that the previous policy has not
been totally abandoned, and that there are still some situations in which
it is error for the military judge to take account of the Government's
view on sentencing. In United States v. Lund,100 the military judge
asked the trial counsel to give the Government's opinion as to the
proper sentence. The military judge explained: "If we're going to go
on the civilian-type practice of law, as we have been instructed we
should do, I feel that it is helpful to the court to have the benefit of the
views of the Government's counsel." The trial counsel made a recom-
mendation as to sentence, and immediately thereafter the military judge
imposed sentence in accordance with the recommendation. The Court
of Military Review held that this practice was clearly improper. Not
only did it fail to meet the requirements of the Manual for Courts-
Martial, paragraph 75, with regard to presentencing, but it also caused
the trial counsel to violate provisions of that section to the effect that the
views of the staff judge advocate or the convening authority as to an ap-
propriate sentence are not to be made known to the court. The pro-
cedure was condemned, but no prejudice to the accused was found.
The Lund decision seems difficult to reconcile with United States v.
Villa,'01 under which the military judge seems required to know the
convening authority's (and the staff judge advocate's) view of the ap-
propriate sentence. The approaches represented by the two decisions
would clearly conflict if the prosecution's sentence recommendations
in both cases had been embodied in a pretrial agreement. The ap-
proaches may be reconciled, however, on the basis that in Lund, the
Government's opinion was requested in regard to a "proper" sentence
rather than to a "maximum!' sentence. If the Government's opinion
had been requested with regard to the maximum sentence which should
have been imposed, such an opinion could not prejudice the accused.
In either situation, whether the recommendation of a maximum sentence
were integrated into a pretrial agreement or were presented verbally to
the military judge, it could not exceed the maximum punishment al-
lowed; consequently, a recommendation of a reduced maximum punish-
ment could not but benefit the accused.
One final problem related to sentencing is the inability of the
100. CM 422605 (Apr. 9, 1970).
101. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 564, 42 C.M.R. 116 (1970).
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military judge to suspend a sentence. 10 2 He may make recommenda-
tions to the convening authority for clemency or for a suspension of
sentence,"0 3 but he has no power to compel the convening authority to
act in a particular way with regard to a particular sentence. The mili-
tary judge's recommendation is required to be included in the staff
judge advocate's review of the case.10 4 Thus the military judge's views
are always made known to the convening authority, and should have
some influence on the convening authority. Nevertheless, the inability
to insure that a sentence will be suspended may lead the military judge
to impose a lighter sentence than he otherwise would. It would be
preferable for the military judge to have the power to suspend a sen-
tence. Clothed with that power, the military judge could impose a fair
sentence for the crime, and could at the same time insure that an indi-
vidual accused whom he felt deserved a second chance would receive a
suspension of sentence which could later be revoked if the accused did
not reform. Allowing this practice might give the military judges the
necessary flexibility to tailor each sentence to the particular accused.
VI. Miscellaneous
Some additional matters that are of concern to the military judge,
but do not fit neatly into any of the subjects heretofore discussed, re-
quire some discussion. One of these is the problem of courtroom fa-
cilities. The convening authority is required to provide "an appro-
priate location and facilities for all courts-martial which he con-
venes."'0 r5 In the past, the facilities provided have varied greatly in
quality. One court-martial may be held in what is the equivalent of a
civilian courtroom, while another may be relegated to extremely in-
adequate facilities in day rooms, mess halls and the like. It is impor-
tant that the facilities create an atmosphere in keeping with the solem-
nity of judicial proceedings; much needs to be done in order to achieve
this objective. It is significant to note that relative to their installations,
military courtrooms in Vietnam are, on the average, superior to those
in the United States. The wearing of judicial robes, a practice now
authorized for Army military judges, has certainly enhanced the solem-
nity of the proceedings and has been generally well-accepted by ac-
cused and court members alike.
Turning to the mechanics of the proceedings themselves, there are
102. See 1969 MANUAL 88(e), 97(a).
103. Id. 77(a).
104. Id. 11 77(a), 85(a)-(b).
105. Army Reg. 27-10, para. 2-15(c) (change no. 3) (operative Aug. 1, 1969).
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two problems that have recently given the military judge considerable
difficulty. The first is the problem of instructions on voting. For a
time, the law officer and then the military judge instructed the mem-
bers on voting by providing them with a sentence work sheet and a set
of written voting instructions. Due to the great technicality of certain
voting requirements with which military court members must be made
familiar, this seemed quite a reasonable procedure. Also, courts-mar-
tial often sit for about a month or more hearing various cases, and the
voting instructions are repetitive. Notwithstanding the manifest ad-
vantages of this practice, the United States Court of Military Appeals has
held that the use of written instructions cannot give assurance that the in-
structions were actually used as a substitute for oral instructions. 10 6
Accordingly, a number of cases were reversed as to sentence because of
this error,107 and voting instructions must now be given orally.
The other problem is that of "preserving the record." For illus-
tration, in United States v. Rumpler,10 8 a typographical error in the
portion of the record containing the inquiry into accused's guilty plea
resulted in a failure to record an admission of the requisite intent.
This deficiency necessitated a reversal. In another case,'0 9 the military
judge, instead of reading into the record the information contained on
the charge sheet after the findings, examined the document, obtained
the statement of defense counsel that it was correct, and merely had it
appended to the record. The court held that the information should
have been read into the record and the failure to do so was error. How-
ever, in this case the error was not deemed prejudicial to the accused and
the decision was affirmed.
Such hypertechnical exaltation of form over substance is in reality
harmful to an accused; it merely makes for unnecessary delay in the
final determination of criminal judicial proceedings. A military judge
who must continually preoccupy himself with minor formalities can-
not give his full attention to the important substantive issues of each
case. Many of the above-mentioned possibilities for technical error are
nonexistent in trials by military judge alone, and this fact may further
explain the popularity of that procedure.
106. United States v. Pryor, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 279, 41 C.M.R. 279 (1970).
107. E.g., United States v. Heaston, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 281, 41 C.M.R. 281 (1970);
United States v. Tripp, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 509, 42 C.M.R. 111 (1970); United States v
King, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 500, 42 C.M.R. 102 (1970); Gutierrez, CM 421452 (Apr. 27,
1970).
108. 19 U.S.C.M.A. 479, 42 C.M.R. 81 (1970).
109. Mackie, CM 422397 (Mar. 5, 1970).
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VII. Future Developments
The trend over the past half-century toward judicilization of courts-
martial-a trend ordained by the Congress and the courts alike-will
in all likelihood prove irreversible. Even before the innovations em-
bodied in the 1968 legislation could be digested and assimilated by
the military services, the demand arose for more and greater judicializa-
tion. But however critical the reformers may be, seldom do they rec-
ommend "throwing out the baby with the bathwater." Instead, almost
without exception, the reformers have advocated improvements in the
existing system-most particularly, increases in the authority and re-
sponsibility of the military judge. This sort of reform can surely be
received by military judges as an accolade for their performance on the
bench.
It requires no gift of prophecy to predict that the role of the mili-
tary judge will continue to expand. The next important change may
well be the assignment of all military judges to the United States Army
Judiciary and the consequent elimination of "part-time" judges, even
for special courts-martial."' Thereafter, the authority of the judge in the
area of sentencing (except possibly in capital cases)"' will likely be
broadened. All agree that the judge should have the power to suspend
sentences; 112 at least in the cases where he has the sentencing authority.
In view of the United States Court of Military Appeals' continuing
demand for regularization of search authority,'1 3 the military judge will
110. In a letter to all staff judge advocates dated 6 November 1970, the Judge
Advocate General restated his goal "to assign sufficient JAGC officers to the United
States Army Judiciary so that all special courts-martial cases can be tried by a full-time
judge.
111. See Hodson, ARMED FORCES J., Apr. 11, 1970, at 13.
112. The Courts of Military Review and the United States Court of Military
Appeals have the power to grant extraordinary relief, but it is not clear whether or not
the military judge has such power. A statutory grant would serve to clear up this
matter.
113. Certain recurrent problems related to searches and seizures could probably
be solved if current military practice were made to conform more closely to civilian
practice. The Court of Military Appeals outlined the basic problems in United States v.
Hartsook, 15 U.S.C.M.A. 291, 35 C.M.R. 263 (1965): "In military law . . . there is no
provision for the issuance of a warrant to search. Power to authorize a search is within
the province of the commanding officer, including an officer in charge. . . . In this
context he stands in the same relation vis-a-vis the investigating officer and an accused
as the Federal magistrate. And we have so equated him.
"While he issues no warrants, the commanding officer is bound by the same
rules in authorizing a search as his [civilian] opposite number; that is, probable cause
to believe that the things to be seized are on or within the premises to be searched.
"Where an affidavit, establishing the grounds for issuing a warrant, has been
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doubtless soon be given magisterial functions. These could include the
power to review pretrial confinement, to issue search warrants, and to
grant extraordinary relief. Conferment of such powers would make
the military judge even more closely resemble a federal district court
judge. Perhaps the most important item on the list is the power to issue
search warrants. The military judge could easily assume this function
and could thereby insure that all searches are conducted only upon prob-
able cause. The upshot would be a reduction in the rather high inci-
dence of illegal searches and resulting reversals. Moreover, most com-
manding officers would not object to having someone with more suit-
able training and experience assume the duty of determining when prob-
able cause exists.
The Army judiciary is willing and able to assume these additional
duties and responsibilities. Many of the innovations heretofore dis-
cussed require action by Congress, and many will be long in coming.
In the interim, the military appellate courts and the service's Judge Ad-
vocates General can be depended upon to increase the already broad-
ened responsibilities of the military judges. If the competence of in-
dividual military judges remains at the high level demonstrated during
the first year of the new legislation, the military justice system cannot
help but function in a fair and impartial manner, in accordance with
the best traditions of American criminal justice.
sworn to before the proper authority, and is available for review, no problem exists as
to the basis for the latter's determination that probable cause existed. . . . But
where, as in the military, authorization generally is granted on a mere verbal presenta-
tion, the issue [whether probable cause existed] must necessarily be determined
through the taking of extensive testimony. This is often a most difficult method of
procedure for in most cases trial is held some period of time later and all concerned
must rely on their memories to recall just what information was supplied and received.
On occasion, the data and testimony available is not sufficient for a proper determi-
nation and on appeal we have had to return the case for a rehearing on this issue."
15 U.S.C.M.A. at 294, 35 C.M.R. at 266.
In a case decided one year after Hartsook, the court cited the foregoing language
and drew the following conclusion: "It is quite apparent that if the civilian practice
were followed the problem would be considerably minimized not only on appellate re-
view but more importantly at time of trial where the issue is initially raised. The
absence of [documentation establishing probable cause] places a tremendous burden on
all the parties and not inconceivably could result in an unjust adjudication of the mat-
ter. We very strongly recommend that the civilian practice be adopted throughout the
military." United States v. Penman, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 67, 69, 36 C.M.R. 223, 225 (1966)
(emphasis added).
January 19711 MILITARY COURTS

